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Introduction
Following the recent crisis, there has been a renewed interest in the identification of the sources of
business cycles. A particular attention has been paid to the driving role of expectations. The literature
has pointed out that changes in expectations may account for a bulk of aggregate fluctuations.1 First,
multiple equilibria and sunspots fluctuations provide an explanation for expectations–driven business
cycle (see Benhabib, Wang and Wen, 2015 and Farmer, 2012).2 Second, changes in expectations can
result from news on economic fundamentals, such as technology improvement or economic policy
(see Beaudry and Portier 2006, 2014, Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2012).
Business cycles could be driven by anticipated change in future economic conditions which almost
never actually materialize. Third, shifts in market sentiments can appear without any modification
in economic outcomes (see e.g. Lorenzoni, 2009, Forni, Gambetti, Lippi, and Sala, 2013). These
sentiments shocks originate from information frictions and can capture waves of optimism and pes-
simism disconnected from any changes in economic fundamentals (see Angeletos and La’o, 2013 and
Angeletos, Collard and Dellas, 2014).
There does not exist a consensus about the contribution of news and sentiments shocks to ag-
gregate fluctuations. Using Structural VectorAutoregressions (SVARs) with long-run and short–run
restrictions, Beaudry and Portier (2006) find that news shocks on Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
account for more than a half of output fluctuations.3 They also obtain similar findings for consump-
tion, investment and hours (see Beaudry and Portier, 2014). However, Barsky and Sims (2011), using
the SVARs setup with another identification strategy, show that news shocks on TFP account for a
sizeable fraction of output fluctuations but contribute modestly to recessions.4 Forni, Gambetti, and
Sala (2014) consider a VAR model augmented with factors and obtain that the impulse responses
for news shock do not generate business type fluctuations. In addition, Forni, Gambetti, Lippi and
Sala (2013) find that noise shocks, unrelated to economic fundamentals, entail long lasting responses
of output, consumption and investment and represent a third of their variance. Using a Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, Blanchard, L’Huillier and Lorenzoni (2013) obtains
1The papers of Blanchard (1993), Hall (1993) and Cochrane (1994) has already highlighted the role of consumer
expectations in business cycle analysis.
2We do not forget the seminal contributions (among others) in macroeconomics of Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and
Farmer (1999).
3The paper of Cochrane (1994) was the first to investigate the role of news shock in a bivariate consumption and
income SVAR setup, but Beaudry and Portier (2006) were the first to characterize news shock on TFP and its dynamic
effects.
4Another part of the controversy concerns the response of investment. In Beaudry and Portier (2006), investment
immediately jumps, whereas it decreases on impact in Barsky and Sims (2011).
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that the noise shock accounts for the bulk of output fluctuations at a yearly horizon. This is in contrast
with Barsky and Sims (2012) who find from the estimation of a structural model that news shock
is the main contributor to aggregate fluctuations, leaving a minor role to noise and sunspot shocks.
Angeletos, Collard and Dellas (2014) obtain from various estimated DSGE models that confidence
shock, unrelated to any fundamentals, can explain about one half of output volatility at business–cycle
frequencies (6-32 quarters).
The heterogeneity of the quantitative findings partly results from the use of different structural
models (the parametric structure of the DSGE model deeply impacts the reduced form) and methods
(restrictions in SVARs) imposed for identification. Regarding these conflictual results, we propose a
simple and weakly restrictive identification scheme of the sentiments shocks as well as other structural
shocks in a SVAR setup. SVARs has been widely used for identification of structural shocks and their
dynamic effects.5 The literature offers many examples of the relevance of the SVAR approach for
macroeconomic modeling purposes (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005).6 Their ability
to properly uncover structural shocks and their contribution to the business cycle is still subject to
controversy 7 but continuous and significant improvements of this setup enhance the usefulness of
this tool for developing business cycle theories.8
A key variable in our quantitative analysis is the sentiments shock. The sentiments shock is iden-
tified as a shock i) orthogonal to fundamentals (for example expected and unexpected or surprise TFP
shocks) ii) with no long–run effect on TFP and other real quantities (per capita output, consumption
or investment) and iii) that accounts for most of the variance of (either consumer or Chief Executive
Officer, CEO) confidence for a given horizon. Restrictions i) and ii) are very standard in the SVAR
literature, as they just exploit long–run restrictions and the exogeneity of a proper measure of TFP.
The novelty here concerns the restriction iii). The sentiments shock is identified as a transitory shock
that best explains future movements in the measure of confidence up to a certain horizon. This re-
striction is in accordance with Angeletos, Collard and Dellas (2014), who obtain that the estimated
confidence from various DGSE models is highly correlated with the University of Michigan Index of
Consumer Sentiment.
We also use different restrictions to identify other (fundamental) shocks: an unexpected (or sur-
5This includes the dynamic effects of monetary policy, government spending, technology and news shocks.
6The news shock approach is a recent illustration of the relevance of SVARs for the development of business cycle
theories (see Beaudry and Portier, 2006 and Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009).
7One of the well known examples is the identification of permanent technology shocks, but we better know under
which conditions SVARs may properly identify these shocks (see Chaudourne, Fe`ve and Guay, 2014, for a review).
8A recent good example is the extension to Factor Augmented VARs with news shock to deal with non–invertibility
problems. We will examine this quantitative issue.
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prise) shock on TFP and a news shock on TFP. Unexpected and news shocks on TFP are identified
using both long–run and short–run restrictions (see Blanchard and Quah, 1989, and Beaudry and
Portier, 2006). The remaining temporary shock is directly deduced from the identification of senti-
ments shock. Armed with these identified shocks, we can investigate which ones drive the business
cycle. In addition, we can determine the relative contribution of fundamental and non-fundamental
shocks to our measure of confidence.
The existing literature offers two representations of confidence/sentiments in unique-equilibrium,
rational-expectations models. Following Angeletos and La’o (2013), Angeletos, Collard and Dellas
(2014) propose a tractable representation of information frictions in DSGE models and the confidence
shock appears as an additional exogenous state variable in the state–space representation of the econ-
omy. Barsky and Sims (2012), Blanchard, L’Huillier and Lorenzoni (2013), Forni, Gambetti, Lippi
and Sala (2013) consider the information imperfection under the form of a noisy signal about technol-
ogy. In this setup, sentiments are (partially) linked to the signal that the agents receive. Our approach
remains agnostic about which type of representation is the more relevant but can potentially capture
the dynamic impact of sentiments shocks on prices and quantities from both sources. Our goal is to
properly identify and quantify the contribution of sentiments shocks to the business cycle and which
type of shocks influence the confidence.
To assess the reliability of our identification procedure, we simulate a DSGE model (see Ireland,
2003) with nominal frictions, permanent technology shocks (unexpected and expected), persistent
demand (monetary policy) shocks and shocks to confidence. We investigate two polar cases. In the
first case, we simulate an economy in which sentiments shocks are idiosyncratic to confidence and
have no aggregate effects. In the second case, we consider an economy in which agents receive a
noisy signal about future improvement in TFP (noisy news). This signal also affect the confidence,
so news and noise on TFP equally explain confidence. This second case is particularly challenging
for SVARs because noises imply non-identifiability of the shocks (See Barsky and Sims, 2012, Blan-
chard, L’Huillier and Lorenzoni, 2013 , Forni, Gambetti, Lippi and Sala, 2013), i.e. agents (and thus
the econometrician) can not disentangle the fundamental (news) shock from the noise on impact.9
Our simulation experiments show that our approach works very well in the first situation of idiosyn-
cratic sentiments, but it still deliver reliable results in the presence of noises, despite the fact that the
9The other representation of confidence (Angeletos and La’o, 2013 and Angeletos, Collard and H. Dellas, 2014) does
not imply the same problems about non-identifiability and involves no additional difficulties for the SVARs approach. The
reason is that the information problem just appears under the form of an additional exogenous state variable.
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noisy signal is the main driver of output fluctuations in the DSGE model.10 In these experiments,
we maintain that the monetary policy shock has no effect on sentiments. We relax this assumption
and we investigate the case when news, demand and sentiments shocks equally explain confidence.
In this case, the contribution of the demand shocks to the business cycle will be wrongly attributed
to the sentiments shocks leading to an overestimation of the contribution of sentiments shocks to the
business cycle.
We next apply our SVAR setup to the US economy for the sample period 1960:1–2011:4. From
the dynamic responses to the four identified shocks and variance decompositions, our five main results
are the following. First, sentiments shock explains very little of output and inflation. Second, the news
and sentiments shocks equally contribute to consumer (and business sector) confidence. Third, the
news shock on TFP accounts for most of the variance of GDP, except in the short–run. Fourth, the
remaining transitory shock11 represents a non–negligible fraction of output variance in the short–run.
Fifth, news on TFP and the remaining stationary shock are almost the sole drivers of inflation.
The presence of news shocks challenges the identification of structural perturbations from SVARs,
as this expected shock could imply non-fundamental representations. Using the simple procedure
proposed by Forni and Gambetti (2014), we assess this issue by conducting orthogonality tests and
considering a Factor Augmented VECM.12 Our findings suggest that, whereas factors are not or-
thogonal to the identified news shock, non-fundamentalness does not matter quantitatively and all
our results obtained from the benchmark case are valid. These above results are also very robust
to various other perturbations of the benchmark model (alternative measures of quantities, inflation
and confidence; alternative identification strategy). Our findings are in line with Beaudry and Portier
(2006) and Barsky and Sims (2012). News shocks on TFP are an important driver of the business
cycle and sentiments shock appears to be mostly as an idiosyncratic component of confidence.
The paper is partly built from the existing literature. First, our approach decomposes the sources of
business cycles into permanent and transitory components (supply shocks versus demand shocks) and
thus follows the approach initiated by Shapiro and Watson (1988), Blanchard and Quah (1989) and
Galı´ (1999). However, we disentangle two permanent shocks and two transitory shocks, i.e. shocks
10In our simulation experiments, the noisy signal explains almost 70% of output fluctuations.
11In the empirical section of the paper, we decide to label this shock as a demand shock, because it persistently increases
both prices and quantities.
12This procedure can detect one kind of non-fundamentalness, i.e., the one that arises when the econometrician’s
information set is smaller than that of agents.This differs from the other kind of non-fundamentalness problem originating
from imperfect information with respect to agents’ information set. A part of the simulation experiments in Section 2
is devoted to examine the quantitative severity of this latter source of non-fundamentalness. For a discussion on non-
fundamental representations and the difference with a non-invertible representation, see Gourie´roux and Monfort (2015),
p. 7–8.
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that are absent from these celebrated papers. Second, our empirical strategy combines the identifica-
tion scheme previously proposed by Beaudry and Portier (2006) and Barsky and Sims (2011), but we
do not focus on news shock only and its contribution to the business cycle. Finally, Matsusaka and
Sbordone (1995) have been the first (to our knowledge) to consider the role played by confidence in
SVARs and the associated sentiments shocks on key aggregate variables. However, they only use a
partial identification of shocks in their structural autoregressions13 and do not consider other potential
competing sources of aggregate fluctuations.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we present the SVAR setup and our iden-
tification strategy. In section 2, we assess the reliability of our strategy. Section 3 reports the main
empirical results. Section 4 is devoted to the robustness analysis. A last section concludes.
1 Identification from SVARs
Our empirical strategy relies on SVARs with both long–run, medium–run and short–run restrictions.
More precisely, we develop a Structural Vector Error Correction Model (SVECM) which allows to
impose long–run restrictions compatible with cointegration relationships among non–stationary vari-
ables.14 We next impose a set of minimal restrictions on the medium–run and short–run dynamics.
Let yt be a vector that includes four time series variables
yt =

TFPt
Quantitiest
Inflationt
Confidencet
 .
The variable TFPt is a measure of Total Factor Productivity. This variable is used here for the separate
identification of surprise and news shocks on TFP. The variable labeled Quantitiest will refer to real
non–stationary variables (GDP, consumption, investment, labor productivity). The variable Inflationt
is introduced for identification of transitory shocks. Finally, Confidencet is a measure of confidence
in the private sector (households and business sector). This variable is central in our quantitative
analysis. It allows to identify the sentiments shock, but we also use it to evaluate the contribution of
13They impose a recursive representation of the VAR system, without a full characterization of shocks. This is typically
the SVAR representation used in Barsky and Sims (2012), but as they judiciously noticed, this setup is just an auxiliary
model without any a priori structural economic interpretation. Their structural DSGE model is then estimated by indirect
inference from this auxiliary SVAR.
14We relax this SVECM representation in section 4.3 by considering a level specification of the variables.
6
various structural shocks to confidence. We shall describe these variables in more details below. This
set of variables is assumed to follow a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) of the form15
∆yt = αβ
′yt−1 + Γ1∆yt−1 + . . .+ Γp∆yt−p + ut , (1)
where ∆ is the first difference operator and p denotes the number of selected lags on ∆yt. α and β
are K× r (where K = 4) matrices of loading parameters and cointegrating vectors, respectively. The
(K × K) matrices Γj (j = 1, . . . , p) are referred to short–run parameters. The deterministic part is
omitted to simplify the presentation without altering the results below. Finally, the error term ut is
assumed to be a zero–mean weak white noise with a time invariant covariance matrix, E(utu′t) = Σ.
From the VECM (1), the Moving-Average representation is uncovered, namely:
∆yt = C(L)ut ,
with C(L) =
∑∞
i=0CiL
i and C0 = IK .
The reduced form error terms in ut are a combination of structural shocks εt. A common nor-
malization identification assumption is that the structural innovations εt have zero–mean and identity
covariance matrix. In addition, they are linearly related to ut such that
ut = A0εt , (2)
where A0 is K × K matrix. From the above normalization, it follows that Σ = A0A′0. Without
additional restrictions, A0 is not uniquely identified and we must impose additional restrictions. Fol-
lowing Lu¨tkepohl (2007), the multivariate Beveridge-Nelson Moving–Average representation of the
VECM (1) can be obtained by applying the Granger’s representation theorem, namely
yt = C(1)
t∑
i=1
ui +
∞∑
i=0
C∗i ut−i + y
∗
0 , (3)
where y∗0 contains the initial values and C
∗
i are absolutely summable. The (K × K) matrix C(1)
allows to uncover the long-run effect of structural shocks and it is given by
C(1) = β⊥
[
α′⊥
(
IK −
p∑
i=1
Γi
)
β⊥
]−1
α′⊥ ,
15We also consider a level representation of variables in the robustness analysis. See section 4.3
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where α⊥ and β⊥ denote the orthogonal complements of α and β. The rank of the long-run matrix
C(1) is K − r, where r is the cointegrating rank. Thus, there exists K − r common trends in the
terminology of Stock and Watson (1988). Using (2) and (3), the long–run effects of the structural
shocks is then given by C(1)A0. Because the matrix A0 is of full rank, the rank of C(1)A0 is K − r
and there can be at most r zero columns in the matrix of the long-run effects of the structural shocks.
It means that at most r structural shocks can have transitory effects and at leastK−r structural shocks
can have permanent effects. Consequently, the rank of C(1)A0 yields at most r(K − r) independent
restrictions. The knowledge of the cointegrating rank r gives the maximum number of independent
restrictions that can be imposed on the long-run effects of the structural shocks (see Lu¨tkepohl, 2007).
However, the number of transitory shocks can be smaller that r requiring that the remaining structural
permanent shocks are linearly dependent in order to respect the rank condition for C(1)A0. For the
local identification of the structural shocks, we must impose K(K − 1)/2 restrictions on A0 and
C(1)A0. With K = 4, six restrictions (at least) are needed to identify the four structural shocks.
The aim of the identification strategy is to retrieve two potential permanent structural shocks,
labeled as a pure surprise TFP shock (or unexpected TFP shock) and a news TFP shock (a shock that
does not materialize today but that can follow a slow diffusion process), and two transitory shocks,
one of them being the sentiments shock. The first restriction (Identification I) aims to disentangle the
permanent and the transitory shocks. It uses the empirical result (see below) that we cannot reject the
hypothesis the rank of C(1)A0 is equal to one.
Identification I (two long–run restrictions): the two stationary shocks (including sentiments) have
no long–run effect on TFP and quantities.
This restriction, together with the cointegration between TFP and quantities, allows to identify
separately the two supply and demand shocks. This implies that the matrix of long–run multiplier
A(1) = C(1)A0 is given by
A(1) =

a11(1) a12(1) 0 0
a˜11(1) a˜12(1) 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 ,
where a11(1) = β12a˜11(1) and a12 = β12a˜12(1). β12 denotes the cointegrating parameter between TFP
and quantities. This structure of the matrix A(1) is a direct consequence of the long–run restriction
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that we impose. It exists one common long-run trend in the vector of variables yt, the share of the
variance of TFP and quantities explained by the two supply shocks are the same (the first and second
lines are perfectly co–linear) and the two stationary shocks have no long–run effect on TFP and
quantities. This is compatible with a rank of the long–run matrix A(1) equal to one, i.e. one common
trend. The two supply shocks have a proportional effect on the first two variables and the two other
shocks are transitory in respect with these two non-stationary variables. This means that the number
of zeros in the matrixA(1) and the rank ofA(1) result in two identifying restrictions only. This leaves
to consider four additional restrictions to properly identify the four structural shocks.
Identification II (one short–run restriction): the news TFP shock has no short–run effect on the
level of TFP.
This short–run restriction follows the empirical strategy first proposed by Beaudry and Portier
(2006). This assumption is now common in the SVAR literature to disentangle a pure surprise TFP
shock from a news shock (see Beaudry and Portier, 2005, 2006, Barsky and Sims, 2011, Beaudry
and Lucke, 2010).16 A news shock accounts for expectations of future productivity changes and it is
orthogonal to a surprise TFP shock. Namely, a news shock has zero impact effect on the level of TFP
but could explain the main bulk of TFP in the medium and the long–run.
Identification III (two short–run restrictions): the two stationary shocks (including sentiments)
have no short–run effect on the level of TFP.
This restriction also implies that the measure of TFP is unaffected on impact by the two stationary
shocks. The sentiments shock represents shifts in expectations about business cycles without changes
in the fundamentals of the economy. The zero impact effect of the sentiments shock is a weak version
of the fact that this shock is assumed to be disconnected from changes in economic fundamentals and,
in particular, changes in aggregate productivity. This identification also imposes that the remaining
stationary shock has no contemporaneous impact on TFP. If the TFP is properly measured (see Fernald
2012), we can expect almost no effect of stationary shocks on TFP. This restriction combined with
identification II allows to identify the structural technology shock to be the unpredictable residual
component of TFP.17
16This also corresponds to the specification of news shocks in DSGE models (see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2012,
Fujiwara, Hirose and Shintani, 2011, and Khan and Tsoukalas, 2012).
17We will discuss this identification in the robustness analysis.
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Identification IV (one medium–short–run restriction): among transitory shocks, the sentiments
shock maximizes its contribution to the variance decomposition of confidence series up to a certain
horizon.
The sentiments shock is identified as the shock that best explains the future movements in the
measure of (consumer or business sector) confidence conditional on the identification of the supply
shocks (the two permanent shocks in our setup). In other words, identification IV imposes that the
sentiments shock is the shock that represents the largest share of the confidence’s variance (up to a
certain horizon) among the two transitory shocks conditional on identification I and identification II
of the TFP and news shocks. This identification strategy maximizes the importance of the sentiments
shock as an explanation of the fluctuations in the private confidence.
This identifying restriction deserves here two comments. First, this identification is consistent
with previous findings. Angeletos, Collard and Dellas (2014) find that the estimated confidence from
various DGSE models is highly correlated with the University of Michigan Index of Consumer Senti-
ment and the Conference Board’s Indices of Consumer or Producer Confidence. Second, this identi-
fication yields an upper bound estimate on the effects of sentiments shocks. To see this, suppose that
the remaining stationary shock is main driver of confidence. In such a case, the contribution of these
shocks to the business cycle will be attributed to the sentiments shocks.18 We will now expound the
implementation of this procedure.
Implementation
The identification of sentiments shocks is achieved by implementing the following two–step pro-
cedure.
Step 1: The first step uses identification I and identification II to uncover the two potential perma-
nent shocks, i.e., the unanticipated and the anticipated technology shocks. This allows us to identify
the two first columns of the A0 matrix. We implement this first step by imposing that the contempora-
neous effect of the remaining stationary shock to confidence is set to a¯0,43, i.e., an initial value in the
procedure that can be either zero or any other. This implies the following organization of the matrix
18See the simulation experiments in the next section for an illustration.
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A˜0
A˜0 =

a0,11 0 0 0
a0,21 a0,22 a0,23 a0,24
a0,31 a0,32 a0,33 a0,34
a0,41 a0,42 a¯0,43 a0,44
 .
So, conditional on the identification of supply shocks, the matrix A˜0 is then just-identified.
Consider now the forecast error of ∆yt function from this identification schema. The k–step ahead
forecast error is then given by
∆yt+k − Et∆yt+k =
h∑
τ=0
CτA0εt+k−τ =
h∑
i=0
Cτ A˜0Fεt+k−τ ,
for all F such that FF ′ = I and h = k − 1. The matrix F is an orthonormal matrix and A0 = A˜0F .
Now consider that F has the following structure
F =
 I2 02
02 F22
 ,
where I2 is an identity matrix of dimension 2 × 2, 02 a matrix of dimension 2 × 2 containing only
zero as elements and F22 is a 2 × 2 orthonormal matrix such that F22F ′22 = I2. Consequently, the
first two columns of A0 and A˜0F are the same. These two first columns identify the impact of both
supply shocks (unexpected and news shocks on TFP) on the four variables contained in yt. The first
two columns of the matrix A0 are then identified. Consider the following partition A0 = [A1 A2],
where the matrixA2 is of dimension 4×2. We identify the last two columns ofA0 by finding a matrix
F22 with F22F ′22 = I such that A2 = A˜2F22 for all admissible matrices F22 and where the matrix A˜2
contains the last two columns of A˜0. The resulting moving-average component
h∑
τ=0
CiA˜2F22ε
T
t+h−τ =
h∑
τ=0
CiA2ε
T
t+h−τ ,
gives the forecast error of all variables contained in yt as function of the transitory shocks only εTt
with εt =
(
εPt
′
, εTt
′)′ and εPt is the vector of the permanent structural shocks. Accordingly, the share
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of the forecast error of the variable i to the transitory shock j at horizon h is:
Ωi,j(h) =
∑h
τ=0Ci,τ A˜2F22eje
′
jF
′
22A˜
′
2C
′
i,τ∑h
τ=0Ci,τΣC
′
i,τ
=
∑h
τ=0Ci,τ A˜2γγ
′A˜′2C
′
i,τ∑h
τ=0Ci,τΣC
′
i,τ
.
where ej is a selection 2 × 1 vector with one in the jth element and zeros elsewhere and γ is the jth
column of F22. Given this computed share of forecast error due to transitory shocks, we now turn on
the second step that allows to identify the sentiments shock.
Step 2: We choose the impulse vector that maximizes the cumulative sum corresponding to the
contribution of the sentiments shock to the forecast error variance of confidence up to horizon H
given by:19
γ∗ = argmaxγ
H∑
h=0
Ω4,4(h) , (4)
subject to 
A˜2(1, 1) = 0
A˜2(1, 2) = 0
γ′γ = 1.
This maximization problem chooses the sub–matrix A2 maximizing contributions to
∑H
h=0 Ω4,4(h).
The constraint A˜2(1, 1) = A˜2(1, 2) = 0 imposes that the stationary shocks have no contemporaneous
impact on TFP. Uhlig (2003) shows that this maximization problem can be rewritten as a quadratic
form in which the non-zero portion of is γ the eigenvector associated with the maximum eigenvalue
of a weighted sum of
(
C4,τ A˜2
)′ (
C4,τ A˜2
)
over τ (see also Barsky and Sims, 2011). In other words,
this procedure essentially identifies sentiments shock as the main driver of the cumulative sum of the
confidence variance decomposition (up to the horizon H) conditional on the identification of supply
shocks in the the first step (see Identification I and Identification II).
Summing–up
19Francis, Owyang, Roush and DiCecio (2012) propose to use the forecast error variance for a horizon h given by
Ωi,j(h) instead of its cumulative sum.
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To sum–up, our restrictions imply the followings in the short–run: i) the measure of TFP is un-
affected by news and stationary shocks on impact; ii) quantities, inflation and confidence can freely
respond to each shock in the short–run and iii) among shocks with non–permanent effects, the senti-
ments shock is the main driver of confidence in the short–medium–run. According to Identifications
I–IV, the matrix of impact responses A0 is organized as follows:
A0 =

a0,11 0 0 0
a0,21 a0,22 a0,23 a0,24
a0,31 a0,32 a0,33 a0,34
a0,41 a0,42 a0,43 a0,44

Three lines are of particular interest for our quantitative anlysis: {a0,2i, a0,3i, a0,4i} with i = 1, 2, 3, 4
in the A0 matrix. These lines yield the short–run responses of quantities, prices and confidence to
identified shocks. Note that we impose no restriction on these lines except that a0,43 is obtained from
our identification scheme that the sentiments shock is the main driver of confidence, i.e. it is obtained
from the maximization problem (4). Most of the restrictions concerns the first line, associated to the
response of TFP to the four shocks. So, the measure of TFP is mainly used for identification purpose.
2 Assessing the SVAR Model
We use artificial data generated from a DSGE model to assess the performance of our identification
strategy. We investigate here two polar cases. In the first case, we simulate an economy in which
sentiments shocks are idiosyncratic to confidence and have no aggregate effects. In the second case,
we consider an economy in which agents receive a noisy signal about future improvement in TFP
(“noisy news”). The model used is similar to Ireland (2003) extended to the case of sentiments.20 The
model features monopolistic competition and nominal price rigidities under the form of a quadratic
adjustment costs function. The economy is composed of a representative household, a representa-
tive finished goods-producing firm, a continuum of intermediate goods-producing firms and a central
bank. The model is feeded by a permanent TFP shock, with both an unexpected and expected (with
one lag) component. The model also includes persistent shocks to the monetary policy. The only dif-
ference with Ireland (2003) concerns the presence of a variable related to confidence. More precisely,
20To save space, we do not report the description of the model and we refer to Ireland (2003).
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we introduce the following measurement equation for confidence:
Confidencet = ρsConfidencet−1 + µ1ε
unexpected
t + µ2ε
news
t + µ3ε
noisy news
t + µ4ε
monetary
t + µ5ε
idiosyncratic
t ,
where εunexpectedt , εnewst , ε
noisy news
t , ε
monetary
t and ε
idiosyncratic
t are the the surprise TFP shock, the news TFP
shock, the noise shock (on expected TFP), the monetary policy shock and an idiosyncratic component
of confidence, respectively.
This specification is similar (to some respects) to the one adopted by Barsky and Sims (2012). It
allows for an uniform persistence effect of various shocks to confidence as it includes an autoregres-
sive parameter ρs ∈ [0, 1). In practise we set ρs = 0.8. The effect of various sources of fluctuations in
confidence are governed by the parameters µi (i = 1, .., 5). In what follows, we set µ1 = 0, i.e. unex-
pected TFP shock are constrained to have no effect on confidence.21 We concentrate our quantitative
experiments to the four parameters µi (i = 2, ...5). The parameters µ2 and µ4 govern the contribution
of news TFP shock and monetary (demand) shock on the confidence. These two fundamental shocks
of the model may thus affect confidence. In our benchmark quantitative evaluation we set µ4 = 0,
so fundamental demand shocks have no effect on confidence. Because our identification strategy,
i.e. among transitory shocks, the shock that contributes much to fluctuations in confidence is not a
demand shock, we will relax this assumption and inspect how our identification procedure still works
well.
Two parameters will also receive a particular attention. First, the parameter µ5 governs the effect
of an idiosyncratic shock to confidence. If µ3 = 0 (no effect of noise), the confidence variable is
only explained (up to the news shock in TFP) by an idiosyncratic component that exerts no effect on
aggregate variables (TFP, output, inflation, ...). In this case, the measurement equations rewrites
Confidencet = ρsConfidencet−1 + µ2εnewst + µ5ε
idiosyncratic
t .
This particular parametrization represents a situation where the sentiments shock (the idiosyncratic
shocks in this case) only influences confidence, without any aggregate consequences. This is the first
polar case examined. For the second polar case, the parameter µ3 measures the effect of noise on
confidence. This noise comes from a noisy signal that agents receive about future improvement in
TFP, i.e. “noisy news” (see the discussion below). We impose µ5 = 0, i.e. fluctuations in confidence
21In a sensitivity analysis, we explore the effects on non-zero effect of the unexpected TFP shock. Our main findings
are left unaffected. To save space, we do not report the results.
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are now partly the consequence of shocks, unrelated to economic fundamentals that both affect prices,
quantities and confidence. This shock is obtained by a standard signal extraction problem when
private agents receive a noisy signal on news shocks on TFP. This means that we must include in the
DSGE model an additional parameter (the variance of noise). In practise, we set the same variance for
the news and the noise in TFP. In addition, consistent with the information problem, the parameters
µ2 and µ3 are set to be equal in the confidence equation. So the measurement equation now takes the
form:
Confidencet = ρsConfidencet−1 + µ2 (εnewst + ε
noisy news
t︸ ︷︷ ︸).
Noisy signal
For this case, sentiments shocks are assimilated to “noisy news” shock. To compute artificial time–
series, we draw 1000 independent random realizations of the TFP shocks (unexpected and expected),
the monetary policy shock, and depending on the experiment on the idiosyncratic or the noise shock.
Using the parameters of Table 1, we compute 1000 equilibrium paths for TFP, output, inflation and
confidence. In all experiments, the sample size is equal to 250 quarters, as in actual data. In order
to reduce the influence of initial conditions, the simulated sample includes 250 initial points which
are subsequently discarded before the estimation of VECM. The number of lags in VECM models is
set to 3, a value typically used in empirical studies. We apply the identification procedure described
in Section 1 and we inspect if the SVAR model is able to uncover the true shocks. Each figure also
report the 90% confidence interval (the grey area) together with the true response. We first start with
the case of idiosyncratic shock on confidence, then consider the case of “noisy news” shocks on TFP
and then discuss the reliability of our identification procedure when demand (monetary policy) shocks
can affect confidence.22
Idiosyncratic Shock on Confidence
In this first experiment, only the news and the idiosyncratic shocks can affect confidence and
sentiments shocks have no effect on economic activity. The results are reported in Figure 1. The
SVAR model reproduces very well the true responses of TFP, output, inflation and confidence for
both shocks. The true responses are within the 90% confidence interval of the estimated ones. Notice
that when we inspect the invertibility of the DSGE model (see Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez,
22To avoid singularity problems in the case of noisy signal about expected TFP, we add a small measurement error in
the sentiments/confidence equation. See Table 1.
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Sargent and Watson, 2007), we obtain that no eigenvalue exceeds unity, meaning the VAR setup is
able to recover the structural shocks. This is also confirmed by the comparison of forecast error
variance decompositions and the high correlation between the true and estimated structural shocks.
For example, the DSGE model is calibrated such that the news and the idiosyncratic shocks equally
explain the variance of confidence. In the SVAR model, the variance explained by news shocks is
equal to 53% in the short run.
“Noisy news” Shock on TFP
We now examine another situation when agents receive a noisy signal about future improvement
in TFP. The (log of) TFP is described by the following equation
TFPt = γz + TFPt−1 + ε
unexpected
t + ε
news
t−1 .
Private agent receives a noisy signal st about the news shock, i.e. st = εnewst + νt, where the noise νt
has zero mean and variance σ2ν . The expected next period TFP is given by
E (TFPt+1/It) = γz + TFPt + E (εnewst /It)
where the information set It is given by present and past values of TFPt and st. The term E (εnewst /It)
is obtained as the linear projection of εnewst on st, that is
E (εnewst /It) = αst
where α = σ2εnews/σ
2
s ≡ σ2εnews/(σ2εnews + σ2ν). The agents cannot identify separately the news and
the noise. In this version of the DSGE model, the noise shock on TFP can affect aggregate variables
independently from any changes in fundamental shocks. As pointed out by Blanchard, L’Hullier and
Lorenzoni (2013), this setup is really challenging for SVARs as without the use of strong theoretical
restrictions (estimating for example a DSGE model with information problems), it seems impossible
to properly identify shocks. We acknowledge that our identification procedure may suffer from the
“noisy news” setup23 but we want to quantitatively evaluate if it is a serious problem.24
This is because agents cannot separate the news and the noise shocks. By varying the variance
23To circumvent this problem, Forni, Gambetti, Lippi and Sala (2013) propose to use SVARs with dynamic rotations.
24Note that we can not apply the procedure described in Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, Sargent and Watson
(2007), because the noise creates a singularity problem into the measurement equation. In their notations, the matrix D is
non-invertible.
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of noise (with respect to the variance of news), we can increase or decrease the information problem.
In practise, we set the same variance for the news and the noise shocks. It follows that the news and
the noise equally explain confidence. With our parametrization (See Table 1), the contribution of the
noisy signal to output fluctuations is almost 70%. Note that, contrary to the previous experiment, the
sentiments shock (the noise) can affect economic fluctuations.
The results are reported in Figure 2. The dynamic responses after an unexpected TFP shock
are well reproduced (see for example the responses of output and inflation). The SVAR models
tends to underestimate the true response of the TFP to a news shock, but the estimated responses for
output, inflation and confidence are close to the true ones. The SVAR tends also to underestimate
the true response of output and inflation to a demand shock, but the true response lies within the
90% confidence interval. Finally, the SVAR model reproduces well the true response of output and
inflation to a noise shock and slightly but not significantly underestimates the response of confidence
to this shock.
Larger Contribution of Demand Shocks to Confidence
Our simulation experiments have shown (in two polar theoretical setups) that our estimated re-
sponses closely correspond to the true ones, even if the econometrician face identification problems.
However, in all these experiments, we imposed that the demand shock has no effect on confidence.
A natural additional investigation is about the reliability of the procedure when our identification as-
sumption is not verified. We parameterize the measurement equation for confidence such that news,
demand and sentiments shocks equally explain the variance of confidence. The dynamic responses
are reported in Figure 3. The estimated responses to the unexpected and news shocks on TFP are
close to the true ones. This is not surprising because these two shocks are separately identified (from
demand and sentiments shocks) using long–run restrictions. The main differences concern the esti-
mated effects of the sentiments and demand shocks. The procedure tends to confound (in the very
short–run) these two shocks. For example, the estimated response of output and inflation to a senti-
ments shock is positive, as in the case of a demand shock. The inspection of the correlation between
the true and estimated structural shock reveals a positive link between the estimated sentiments shock
with the true demand (monetary policy) shock, revealing the confusion creating by the identification
procedure. Finally, the estimated response of confidence to demand shock (as imposed by the identi-
fication procedure) is close to zero. This finding is not problematic for our findings from actual data.
They just indicate that if demand shocks contribute a lot to confidence, the econometrician tends to
attribute too much weight on sentiments shock. If she obtains very small effect of sentiments shocks
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on prices and quantities, this just reveals that she would not confound this shock with a demand shock.
3 Empirical Results
After a description of the data, this section presents the main results from our benchmark specification
(IRFs, variance decomposition and history).
3.1 US Data
Our identification of the news shocks requires the observation of the TFPt variable, which we will
decompose into an unexpected (or surprise) component and a news shock. This implies that the empir-
ical measure of productivity properly reflects the unobserved variations in inputs. Recently, Fernald
(2012) proposed a quarterly frequency measure with adjustments for variations in factor utilization–
labor effort and the workweek of capital. According to specification (1), the growth rate of TFPt is
then included in our VECM. The variable Quantitiest is the log of real GDP (GDPC96) divided by
population 16 and over (CNP16OV).25 The growth rate of GDP is thus included in the VECM. The
rate of inflation is obtained from the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers all items (CPI-
AUCSL).26 In DSGE models with nominal rigidities, inflation is a jump variable reflecting expected
marginal costs. So, we believe that this variable contains a sizeable amount of forward–looking com-
ponent. In addition, this allows us to disentangle two stationary shocks. Finally, a “proxy” measure
of the variable Confidencet is obtained from the Michigan Survey data. Following Barsky and Sims
(2012), the survey that we first use is the responses to the question “Turning to economic conditions in
the country as a whole, do you expect that over the next five years we will have mostly good times, or
periods of widespread unemployment and depression, or what?”. The variable is then obtained as the
difference between the percentage giving a favourable answer and the percentage giving a negative
answer, plus one hundred. This variable (E5Y) is taken in log.27 The sample period runs from 1960:1
to 2011:4.
25Other measures of real quantities, such as real per-capita consumption (non durables and services) and real per-capita
investment (durables and private fixed investment) and labor productivity will be included in the model in replacement of
GDP. See Section 4.
26We consider another measure of inflation, using the CPI all items less food and energy (CPILFESL). See Section 4.
27As in Barsky and Sims (2012), we will consider other measures of confidence: a second measure of confidence
is obtained from a similar question for a shorter horizon of twelve months (E12M) and a third measure is an index
of consumer sentiments (ICS) partly constructed from E5Y and E12M. We will also consider CEO confidence survey
condition. See Section 4.
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We perform first ADF unit root tests on (adjusted) TFP and quantities (GDP, labor productivity,
consumption, investment) and we cannot reject the null hypothesis. We also conduct ADF unit root
tests on the first difference of these variables and then reject the null hypothesis. We then perform a
cointegration test between TFP and the selected variables for quantities. We obtain from an ADF test
on the residuals of the estimated relationship that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at
conventional level. The cointegration parameter β12 between TFP and quantities (GDP, investment,
consumption, labor productivity) is then inserted in our VECM and the four structural shocks are
identified using Identifications I-IV. We also perform ADF unit root test for inflation and the consumer
confidence and we can reject the null hypothesis at conventional level.
3.2 Dynamic Responses in the Benchmark Case
The VECM is estimated with three lags, according to standard statistical criteria. Our results are
modestly affected by other lag selection. The selected horizon H in the second step is set to 40, so
sentiments shock is identified as the main driver (among stationary shocks) of consumer confidence
from impact to 10 years. Other choices for the horizon does not change so much our results. The
estimated impulse response functions (IRFs) are reported in Figure 4. The shaded areas represent the
90% confidence bands obtained from bootstraps with 2000 replications.
Surprise TFP Shock
Let us first consider the dynamic responses of the four variables after a surprise TFP shock. The
adjusted TFP jumps immediately and then slowly decreases to its long–run level. At the same time,
GDP increases and the rate of inflation too. Note that the dynamic responses of inflation is signifi-
cantly different from zero in the short–run. Our findings are similar to Barsky, Basu and Lee (2014)
who obtain a positive and significant response of inflation during eight quarters. This surprising result
is difficult to reconcile with sticky-price model, because a mean reverting TFP shock will decrease
the marginal cost for several period. This is also inconsistent with Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006)
who show that inflation persistently decreases after a TFP shock. Anticipating upcoming results, this
suggests that TFP includes another component (news shock in our setup) that can potentially recon-
cile our findings with the data. Finally, the consumer confidence increases on impact, but afterward
the dynamic response is persistently negative. The surprise TFP shock does not seem to have a lot of
explanatory power on consumer confidence.
News TFP Shock
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The dynamic responses after a news shock on TFP differ sharply see the right top panel of Figure
4. First, the adjusted TFP does not react on impact (by construction), stays around zero during two
years and then increases very gradually. TFP reaches its new long–run value after more than ten
years. This shape of the response highlights a slow diffusion process of a technology improvement
(see Portier, 2014). We obtain a significantly positive response of output on impact followed by a rapid
increase. This finding is consistent with the news-driven business cycles (see Beaudry and Portier,
2014), as output reacts immediately to an expected component in TFP. Since controversies concern the
response of quantities to the news shock (Beaudry and Portier, 2006, 2014, Barsky and Sims, 2011,
Barsky, Basu and Lee, 2014), we will investigate latter the response of other aggregates (investment,
consumption, hours worked) to assess the robustness of this pattern. An important additional result is
about the response of inflation to a “good” news shock. The rate of inflation drops immediately and
gradually goes back to its steady state. Note that the response of inflation is precisely estimated. This
finding is in line with Barsky and Sims (2011) and Barsky, Basu and Lee (2014) who obtain that news
shock on TFP looks like a standard supply shocks. This results appears robust in all our experiments
and perturbations of the benchmark case. The DSGE literature has not paid so much attention to
this dynamic response of inflation, with the noticeable exceptions of Barsky and Sims (2009), Jinnai
(2013) and Barsky, Basu and Lee (2014). In this latter paper, they show that real wage rigidity will
help to reduce marginal cost and then inflation can drop after a news shock. Even more striking is
the large and persistent response of consumer confidence to the news shock. This result is in contrast
with the surprise TFP shock that has very limited and short–lasting effects on consumer confidence.
The response is significantly different from zero for all the selected periods (10 years) after the shock.
Our finding is in line with Barsky, Basu and Lee (2014) from a different SVAR setup, but we obtain
a more persistent response of confidence. These results will be also confirmed when it comes to the
variance decomposition and history of consumer confidence (see section 3.3).
Sentiments Shock
We concentrate our analysis on the effects of the sentiments shock, which constitutes the variable
of interest in our SVAR setup. The dynamic responses after a sentiments shock are reported in the
right bottom panel of Figure 4. Our findings give little support to the widespread belief that consumer
confidence (and so a sentiments shock, given our identification scheme) matters a lot for aggregate
fluctuations.28 First, GDP slightly decreases on impact and then displays a positive hump with a
28By construction, this shock has no impact effect on TFP, but all the responses after the shock are not significantly
different from zero.
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peak after two years. However, the effect on GDP is rather limited if we compare the estimated
response to those obtained after a news shock. Moreover, the dynamic response is not precisely
estimated. Second, the rate of inflation increases a little after the sentiments shock, but again all the
estimated responses are not different from zero. So neither quantities nor prices are affected by the
sentiments shock. Third, the response of consumer confidence is large and persistently positive. The
response of confidence to a sentiments shock (except in the short–run) appears similar to the one
obtained after a news shocks. Together with the weak response of confidence to the surprise TFP and
the remaining stationary shocks, this suggests that news and sentiments shocks are almost the sole
drivers of consumer confidence.
Remaining Stationary Shock (Demand Shock)
Figure 4 also reports the dynamic responses after the remaining stationary shock. This shock
has little effects on TFP (by construction zero on impact) and the dynamic responses are almost not
different from zero for all the periods after the shock. So, our impact restriction does not seem to
distort the shape of the response.29 The response of output displays a hump–shaped pattern and it is
still positive two years after the shock. At the same time, the rate of inflation increases significantly
during the same time span. So, this shock is highly pro–cyclical. We retrieve the persistent effects
of stationary (demand) shocks already highlighted by the SVARs literature (Blanchard and Quah,
1989 and Cogley and Nason, 1995, Galı´, 1999).30 In what follows, we will then label this shock as a
demand shock. This shock has a small positive impact on consumer confidence followed by a negative
effect for 10 quarters. Notice that the response of confidence is not precisely estimated.
3.3 Contribution to Business Cycle
To assess the contribution of identified shocks to business cycle, we conduct two exercises. First, we
perform a standard variance decomposition for both TFP, quantities, inflation and consumer confi-
dence. Second, we construct histories at business cycle frequencies for each variable and then inves-
tigate episodes for which these shocks matter.
Figure 5 reports the variance decomposition for the four variables. First, the measure of adjusted
TFP is almost totally explained by the surprise TFP shock in the short–run. By construction, the three
29We have also investigated this issue and relaxed the zero restriction on impact for this shock. None of our findings is
modified. See the discussion in footnote 31 and the results reported in the online appendix.
30This finding is also confirmed when one considers the effects of monetary policy and government spending shocks
(see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005 and Galı´, Lo´pez–Salido and Valle´s, 2007).
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other shocks have no effect on impact. As the number of periods after the shock increases, the share
of the variance of TFP explained by the surprise TFP shock decreases and the share explained by the
news shock gradually increases. Notice that the contribution of the two stationary shocks is virtually
zero. Second, the surprise TFP shock and the labelled demand shock explained between 80% and 90%
of the variance of GDP in the short–run (on impact and after one period). The share explained by the
latter shock is about 35% at its peak and decreases as the number of periods increases, according to
the long–run restriction. More interestingly, the same pattern applies for the surprise TFP shock. The
news shock appears progressively as the main driver of output fluctuations, since its share exceeds
50% after two years and is around 90% after ten years. These findings are similar to those of Beaudry
and Portier (2014). The sentiments shock has a negligible effect on GDP for all horizons. Third, the
demand (40%) and the news shocks (50%) are the two main drivers of inflation. Barsky, Basu and Lee
(2014) obtain a similar result for the contribution of the news shock to inflation. The effect of surprise
TFP shock is very small in the short–run (just above 5%) and the sentiments shock has again a limited
effect (less than 5%). Fourth, Figure 5 illustrates our identification strategy. Among the two transitory
shocks, sentiments shock explains the bulk of the consumer confidence. Only two shocks accounts
for the volatility of consumer confidence. In the short–run, the sentiments shock is the main driver
(around 65%), followed by the news shock (30%). For longer horizons, the ranking is inverted, since
the news shock accounts for more than 60% of the variance of consumer confidence after ten years,
whereas the share of the sentiments shock falls to 35%. This finding is in line to what obtained Barsky
and Sims (2011) and Barsky, Basu and Lee (2014) in a SVAR setup. Importantly, our results confirm
those of Barsky and Sims (2012) who obtained a similar conclusion from estimating a New Keynesian
structural model. To sum up, the sentiments shock explains a tiny portion of aggregate fluctuations
(quantities and prices) and this shock does not appears as the dominant shock of consumer confidence
in the medium run. The identified sentiments shock seems more as an idiosyncratic component of the
consumer confidence.
Another way to evaluate the relative contribution of the four identified shocks relies on the compu-
tation of the history for aggregate data. The history is obtained as follows. First, we feed the SVECM
with only one of the identified structural shocks. We then perform dynamic simulations and then
obtained a path for TFP, real per capita output, inflation and consumer confidence conditional on the
selected shock. For each variable, we obtain the cyclical component (between 1.5 and 8 years) using
a band pass filter. We then compare the cyclical component conditional on the selected innovation to
the unconditional one. The procedure is then repeated for each shock.
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Figures 6–7 report the history of each variable (successively TFP, GDP, inflation and consumer
confidence) for each shock (successively surprise TFP shock, news TFP shock, demand shock and
sentiments shock). Grey areas represent the NBER recession dates. First, as it is clear from Figure
6 (top panel), TFP is essentially driven by the surprise TFP shock at business cycle frequencies. The
news shock is not associated to fluctuations in TFP, reflecting its long–lasting effects on technology.
The demand shock is weakly correlated with TFP, except in periods that follow the last US recession.
This can reflects that the zero restriction on impact for demand shock should not be imposed. As
noticed below, relaxing this restriction has no consequence for our main pictures. Second, the two
main drivers of GDP are the news TFP shock and the demand shock (see Figure 6 bottom panel). The
news shock is associated to output fluctuations in the seventies and the main economic downturns
during this period (see Barsky, Basu and Lee (2014) for a similar finding). Conversely, the news shock
plays no role during the Volker disinflation episode, nor during the great recession. For the period
starting in the mid–eighties and ending just before 2007, the news shocks is essentially associated to
booms in economic activity. The demand shock has a strong negative effect on output in the beginning
of the eighties. This finding is consistent with the fact that the Volker disinflation was considered
has a main source of the US recession in the early 1980s. Interestingly, the demand shock is also
associated to the drop in output during the great recession. For these two episodes, the sentiments
shock is totally absent and does not represent a drivers of output fluctuations. Concerning inflation
(see the top panel of Figure 7), again the news and demand shocks are both important sources of
fluctuations. The news shock explains the dynamic of inflation during the seventies, whereas the
Volker disinflation originates from a negative demand shock, as well as the recent great recession.
Notice that the surprise TFP shock cannot provide any explanation about inflation. The results with
sentiments shock are mixed: for the seventies the sentiments shock is strongly negatively correlation
with inflation, whereas the correlation appears positive since the mid–eighties. Finally, the inspection
of Figure 7 (bottom panel) reveals that the news shock and the sentiments shock equally explain the
consumer confidence. The news shock heavily explains the huge drop in consumer confidence in the
mid–seventies and the two shocks equally reproduce the decrease in the early eighties. Notice that the
recent crisis is not associated to a big fall in consumer confidence, compared to the mid-seventies and
the early eighties. For the recent crisis period, the sentiments shock seems to have more explanatory
power than the news shock. The two other shocks (unexpected TFP and demand shocks) cannot help
to explain fluctuations in consumer sentiments.
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4 Robustness
We conduct various robustness exercises. First, we include factors in our SVAR and address the issue
of non–fundamentalness. Second, without modifying the size of our SVAR, we investigate the role of
conditioning variables. Third, we use another identification strategy of news shock by adapting the
Barsky and Sims (2011) procedure in our two–step approach. Finally, we assess the sensitivity of our
finding to data measurement (price, confidence measures).31
4.1 A Quantitative Assessment of Non-Fundamentalness
The relevance of SVARs to properly uncover structural shocks has been already addressed by the liter-
ature (see Cooley and Dwyer, 1998, Chari, Kehoe and MacGrattan, 2008, Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Vigfusson, 2007 and Fe`ve and Guay, 2010).32 However, the presence of new shocks raises additional
problems related to non–fundamentalness/non–invertibility issues (Leeper, Walker and Yang, 2013).
This problem occurs because actual variables used by the econometrician might not contain enough
information to properly uncover structural shocks. As discussed in Beaudry and Portier (2014), this is
an important issue in time series econometrics but we must distinguish the qualitative importance of
the critique from its quantitative relevance. From a qualitative perspective, one may or may not find
many situations (depending on the properties of the news process and the variables observed by the
econometrician) for which the reduced form is non-invertible. The quantitative importance relies on
the accuracy of SVARs even if the true data generating process is non-fundamental. This points has
been highlighted by Sims (2012) who demonstrates via Monte–Carlo experiments that SVARs can
yield reliable estimates of the true dynamic responses from DSGE models that are non–invertible.
To address this quantitative issue, we adapt the simple procedure developed by Forni and Gambetti
(2014) to our two–step approach. We proceed in the following four steps:
1. We estimate the VECM and apply our two–step approach to identify the structural shocks.
2. We regress the identified news shock on lagged values of different factors. If the test statistic
does not reject the null hypothesis of orthogonality, then we stop. If not, we go to step 3.
31We have also relaxed the assumption that demand shocks cannot have an effect (on impact) on TFP (see Ben Zeev
and Pappa, 2014, for a quantitative assessment). The demand shock has now an immediate effect on TFP but none of
our previous results are affected. We have also investigate the robustness of the results to other sample selection. When
we consider a shorter sample (1960–2006), i.e. excluding the recent crisis, we obtain the same findings (see the online
appendix).
32A large part of the debate has concerned the identification of permanent unexpected technology shocks and their
effect on hours worked.
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3. We include the relevant factors into our two–step approach and we identify the structural
shocks.
4. Finally, we compare the estimated responses to news shock to those obtained without the rele-
vant factors in the VECM.
Two remarks are worth noting. First, in step 3 of the procedure, we maintain identifications I-IV and
we adapt these restrictions to the case of additional stationary variables. Second, we do not separately
identify the remaining stationary shock (the shock that we continue to label as a demand shock) and
those related to the stationary factors included in the VECM model. Identification can be obtained
only if we impose additional restrictions among these shocks. This is not problematic for our purpose
because we can still identify the news and sentiments shocks and we mainly concentrate our analysis
on these shocks. For the variance decomposition exercise, the composite shock must be interpreted
as a combination of stationary shocks with no long–run effect on TFP and quantities and these shocks
explain the smallest part of the forecast error of confidence up to a certain horizon.
We use the 12 factors constructed at monthly frequency by Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2014) from
a macro (132 macro series) and financial (147 financial series) datasets. The monthly data are then
converted in a quarterly frequency by selecting the last month of the quarter. The Wald and Lagrange
multiplier statistics are large and their p-value are almost zero. So the null hypothesis of orthogonality
is rejected. At the same time, the coefficient of determination of this regression does not appear large
(R2 = 0.38). We also investigate which factor contributes the more to this rejection. The fourth
factor appears to have the largest explanatory power for the news shock.33 So, we repeat the test and
then linearly project the news shock on a constant term and four lags of this factor. We still obtain
large values for the Wald and Lagrange multiplier statistics and the null hypothesis is again rejected
(the p-value is close to zero). Despite the rejection of orthogonality, the coefficient of determination
of this regression is rather small (R2 = 0.14). This R2 measures the share of the variance of news
shocks explained by this most important factor.34 Anticipating on the next results, this suggests that
non–invertibility is indeed an issue present in the data (the orthogonality is rejected), but its effect can
remain quantitatively small (the coefficient of determination is small).
33We find that the 9th and 12th factors are mildly significant but with a small coefficient of determination (around 4%).
34See Beaudry, Fe`ve, Guay and Portier (2015) about the use of the R2 diagnosis for judging the severity of non-
fundamentalness on the estimation of news shocks. In particular, they show when the R2 associated with the sufficient
information test of Forni and Gambetti (2104) is a better indication of the quantitative relevance of the nonfundamentalness
problem than the significance level of the test itself.
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We now proceed with the third step and then include this factor in the VECM. We re–apply the
orthogonality test by regressing the identified news shock in the five–variable model on a constant
and four lags of the remaining eleven factors. Now, the test statistics (Wald and Lagrange multiplier)
do not reject the null hypothesis at conventional level (with p-values at 41%). So, in this Factor
Augmented VECM the contribution of these factors to news shock is very small.
Finally, we compare the estimated responses of TFP, output and consumer confidence to unex-
pected TFP, news on TFP and sentiments shocks. Results are reported in Figure 8. The comparison
with Figures 4–5 makes clear that the estimated responses are similar. Let us first concentrate on
the news shock. Again, TFP increases gradually after a news shock, reflecting the slow diffusion
of a technology improvement. GDP immediately jumps and the medium–run responses are identi-
cal in the benchmark VECM and the Factor Augmented VECM. An additional robust feature is the
persistent decrease of inflation after a positive news shock. Finally, as in the benchmark case, the
news shock have a positive and long-lasting effect on consumer confidence. As another illustration
of the relevance of our results, we compute the correlation between news shocks identified from the
benchmark case and from the Factor Augmented VECM. The correlation is large (0.80) and the two
identified shocks are very similar. This similarity is further illustrated on Figure 9 where we plot the
news shock from Factor Augmented VECM against news shock from the benchmark VECM. As it is
clear from this figure, the two shocks are aligned on the 45 degree line. Now consider the sentiments
shock (see Figure 8). This shock has still a small effect on quantities and prices and only strongly
affects consumer confidence. These findings are confirmed by the variance decomposition exercise
(see the bottom right panel in Figure 8), to be compared to Figure 5. The presence of a factor in the
VECM does not alter our previous findings and all our conclusions are maintained. So, the important
finding that the sentiments shock does not contribute to the cyclical behavior of prices and quantities
is not modified when the non-fundamentalness is taken into account. Although present in the data,
non-fundamentalness/non-invertibility does not quantitatively matter for our findings.
4.2 Other conditioning variables
We now investigate the role of conditioning variables. As previously noticed, conclusions about news
shock must be more deeply inferred from the short–run responses of other aggregates. In addition,
we want to assess if the conditioning variable modifies our main conclusions. We replace the GDP
by investment, consumption and labor productivity, successively. We use the same VECM (1) as
before and we maintain the identification scheme. The number of lags is also the same as before.
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Again, changing the number of lags in the VECM does not modify our results. We just need to adjust
for the cointegration relationship (i.e. adjusting the cointegration parameter β12) between the TFP
and the new variable that represents quantities (investment, consumption and labor productivity). We
conduct another conditioning exercise in which we replace inflation by hours worked. The identified
stationary shock is a shock that does not affect TFP and GDP in the long–run, has no effect on TFP
on impact and yields the smaller contribution to confidence.35
Investment
Let us first consider the dynamic responses with the real per capita investment (defined as the sum
of private fixed investment and durables) instead of GDP. The dynamic responses of TFP, inflation and
consumer confidence after each shock are similar to what we obtained with the GDP in SVAR. The
sole difference concerns the size of the response of investment to each shock, reflecting the higher
volatility of investment compared to output. In the line with Beaudry and Portier (2006, 2014), we
obtain that investment instantaneously increases and very quickly reaches its long–run value after a
positive news shock. At the same time, TFP increases gradually. So, our results are supportive of
the news-driven business cycle. Again, the consumer confidence highly and persistently reacts to
“good” news. The response of inflation to a news shock is persistently negative, as in the benchmark
case. The response of investment to a demand shock displays a hump–shape pattern. Inflation still
increases, but its effect is not precisely estimated. The demand shock has virtually no effect on
consumer confidence. The response of investment to a sentiments shock is hump–shaped and prices
increase. However, the dynamic responses are not different from zero. Consumer confidence strongly
reacts on impact to a sentiments shock but the response displays less persistence, compared to the
benchmark case. Figure 10 reports the variance decomposition for the four variables. The variance
decomposition of TFP is almost same as in the benchmark exercise. Two differences are worth noting.
First, the (transitory) demand shock remains the main driver of investment during three years. For
more periods after the shock, the news shock becomes the larger contributor. Second, the sentiments
shock has a larger but rather limited effect on investment (its larger contribution never exceeds 15%).
Consumption
Now, we consider real per capita consumption in our VECM. This variable is defined as the sum of
non-durable and services expenditures and then is divided by population 16 and over. Concerning the
35To save space, we only report the variance decomposition. Figures of dynamic responses and history are included in
the online appendix.
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dynamic responses, the picture is almost the same as we obtained with GDP.36 The sentiments shock
has limited effects on consumption and inflation, not precisely estimated. Sentiments shock only
affects consumer confidence, without any apparent propagation effect on main aggregates. Figure
11 reports the variance decomposition for TFP, consumption, inflation and consumer confidence,
respectively. The variance decomposition of TFP is almost identical to the benchmark case: the
unexpected TFP shock explains almost totally the variance of TFP in the short–run and the share of
news shock on TFP increases with the horizon. Concerning real per capita consumption, the news
shock is the main driver (60% on impact and more than 95% after five years). The sentiments shock
contributes in the short–run (around 20%), but its effects quickly decreases. Concerning inflation, the
main difference is that demand shock explains the larger share of its variance (more than 50%) and
the contribution of the news shocks is reduced compared to the benchmark case. As in the previous
cases, news and sentiments shocks account for most of the volatility of consumer confidence.
Labor Productivity
The last variable that we consider for quantities is the labor productivity. Labor productivity is
obtained by dividing real per capita GDP by the average weakly total hours (see Francis and Ramey,
2009). The results are similar as what we obtained with GDP. We only discuss the variance decom-
position. The labor productivity is almost totaly governed by the two (unexpected and expected) TFP
shocks (see Figure 12). Again, the news and demand shocks equally explain inflation. The main dif-
ference with the benchmark case concerns the variance decomposition of the consumer confidence.
We obtain that the sentiments shock explains more than 80% of consumer confidence. This has no
consequence for the other variables as this shock weakly affects both quantities and prices.
Hours Worked
Finally, we consider hours worked as another relevant variable for extracting useful information
about sentiments. We use again real per capita GDP for the quantities, but we replace inflation by the
log of hours worked. As in the previous experiment, we use the average weakly total hours. So, the
vector yt rewrites yt = (TFPt,GDPt,Hourst,Confidencet)
′. The shock that we identify with hours
worked is labeled labor market shock. As before, this shock is restricted to have no effect (on im-
pact) on TFP and explains the smallest share of consumer confidence up to horizon 40. The dynamic
responses of TFP, output and consumer confidence to a surprise TFP shock are almost identical to
36As for investment, inflation decreases after a news shocks, making the negative response a robust fact (see Barsky,
Basu and Lee, 2014).
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those obtained in the benchmark model. The response of hours on impact is positive, but rather small.
Then hours display a positive hump–shaped pattern. Note that the response is not precisely estimated
as the confidence interval is very large, except on impact. This is the consequence of modeling hours
in level, when it contains highly persistent low frequency components (see Chaudourne, Fe`ve and
Guay, 2014). The estimated responses of TFP, output and consumer confidence to a news shock are
again close to those obtained before. The difference concerns the large and uninformative confidence
interval. Note that the response of hours worked on impact is small, but hours quickly increase. The
responses of TFP and output to a (transitory) labor market shock are similar as what we obtained
before. The sole difference is the response of consumer confidence which is now negative in the
short–run. Finally, the responses of TFP and output to a sentiments shock are in line with the bench-
mark model. Note that the responses of output and hours to this shock are very similar. The main
difference concerns the response of consumer confidence which is smaller. Concerning the variance
decomposition (see Figure 13), we obtain almost the same conclusions for TFP and GDP. The labor
market shock is an important contributor of output variance in the short–run. This shock explains
almost all the variance of hours on impact, but the news shock is gradually the main contributor of
hours. This finding is in line with Beaudry and Lucke (2010). The sentiments shock again explains
very little of the TFP, GDP and hours worked variances.
4.3 Another Identification Strategy
According to the previous results, the news shock appears as the key driver of quantities-prices fluc-
tuations and it is thus legitimate to assess the robustness of our result to alternative identification
strategies of this shock. Here, we follow Barsky and Sims (2011) and we departs from our long–run
restrictions and estimate a VAR in levels. We use the same variables as in our benchmark setup,
i.e. the model includes TFP, GDP, inflation and consumer confidence. We still impose that only the
unexpected TFP shock can have an effect on current TFP. Among the three other shocks without an
effect on current TFP, the news shock is identified as the shock that yields the largest contribution to
the TFP for a given horizon. Finally, we use our two–step approach to disentangle the demand and
sentiments shocks.
A direct comparison of Figure 14 with Figure 5 (Variance decomposition) makes clear that the
identification strategy of news shocks does not modify our previous findings.37 Concerning the dy-
37We have also investigated the role of the selected horizon. None of our results are altered. We notably obtain that the
Barsky and Sims identification yields almost the same results as our benchmark case when the horizon is large.
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namic responses, we still obtain a gradual increase in TFP together with an immediate jump in GDP
after a positive news shock. Again, inflation persistently decreases and consumer confidence persis-
tently increases after this shock. The demand shock yields a positive hump–shaped response of output
and an increase in prices. Finally, aggregate variables react very modestly to the sentiments shock.
This latter shock only affects consumer confidence. The variance decomposition shows very similar
results as before.38 The sentiments shock explains almost zero of the variance of TFP and GDP and a
small portion of inflation (around 10%). This shock contributes a lot to the variance of the consumer
confidence in the short–run, but ten periods after the shock, the share of the news shock is above 60%.
4.4 Data Measurement
We now assess the role plays by the data measurement. To save space, we only report the variance
decomposition (see Figure 15). First, we replace the Consumer Price Index all commodities by the
Consumer Price Index less food and energy. The role of energy prices appears to be of first impor-
tance, because its cyclical pattern has changed quite a lot. During the seventies and the early eighties,
energy prices were countercyclical consecutive to the successive oil shocks. Conversely, these prices
became procyclical afterwards as the world economic growth (notably emerging economies) has led
to an upward pressure. Energy prices can thus potentially contaminate our identification of supply
and demand shocks. This is not the case. As shown in the upper left panel of Figure 15, the results
are the same. The sole difference is that demand shock contributes more to the variance of inflation.
Second, since the confidence variable is central in our analysis, it will legitimate to assess the sen-
sitivity of our results to other measures. We replace our measure of consumer confidence E5Y by
the a second measure of confidence obtained from a similar question for a shorter horizon of twelve
months (E12M) and an index of consumer sentiments (ICS). The top right panel of Figure 15 reports
the results with E12M and the bottom left with ICS. Compared to the benchmark case, the pictures are
almost the same. The sole difference concerns the contribution of the sentiments shock to GDP that
becomes larger in the short–run (around 25%) with the variable E12M. We also consider a measure
of confidence related to the business sector. We use CEO Confidence-survey conditions in six months
as a proxy for sentiments. The results are reported in the bottom right panel of Figure 15. As it is
clear from this figure, the main results are maintained. The main driver of GDP is still the surprise
TFP shock in the short–run and the news shock explain most of the variance of output as the number
38The main difference with our benchmark setup concerns the contribution of the (transitory) demand shock to the
variance of GDP in the short–run. In the SVECM, this contribution is around 35%, whereas it exceeds 65% with the
Barsky and Sims identification strategy. This is also confirmed by the history. See Figures in the online appendix.
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of periods after the shock increases. The demand shock explains a small share of output volatility,
but a sizeable part on inflation. Finally, the sentiments shock contributes very little to quantities and
prices. This shock only explains the volatility of business sector confidence.
5 Conclusion
The main driving forces of the business cycle are still the subject of much debate and controversy.
We found that a SVAR incorporating a measure of confidence together with aggregate variables (TFP,
GDP, consumption, investment, labor productivity and hours) predicts five main outcomes. First,
sentiments shock explains very little of output and inflation. Second, the news and sentiments shocks
equally contribute to consumer (and business sector) confidence. Third, the news shock on TFP
accounts for most of the variance of quantities. Fourth, the transitory shock (labelled as a demand
shock) represents a sizeable part of fluctuations in the short–run. Fifth, news on TFP and demand
shocks are almost the sole drivers of inflation. These findings are robust to non–fundamentalness,
conditioning variables, alternative identification strategy and data measurement. Our results from a
flexible SVAR model show that the news story of the business cycles, as advocated by Beaudry and
Portier (2006) and (2014) remains a very plausible source of aggregate fluctuations. At the same time,
the sentiments shock, identified as the main contributor of confidence at business cycle frequencies
seems to play a minor role.
Our findings are somewhat disappointing concerning the contribution of the sentiments shock to
macroeconomic fluctuations. We do not think that our identification scheme introduces a bias against
this potential driving source. The proposed identification strategy is flexible and does not restrict the
effect of the type of shock as it can freely impact macroeconomic variables. The identification scheme
only imposes that sentiments represent the main contributor of confidence up to a given horizon. In
addition, our results are insensitive to the selected horizon. As usual in the SVAR literature, the
absence of relevant informative variables can lead to miss some important transmission channels.
However, we have thoroughly investigated many alterations of our setup and none of the alternatives
yield a different picture.
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Table 1: Parameter values
Subjective Discount Factor 0.99
Capital Share 0.33
Depreciation Rate 0.025
Growth Rate of TFP 0.0036
Inverse of the Frish Elasticity of Labor Supply 1
Price Markup 20%
Adjustment Costs on Prices 10
Persistence of monetary Policy Shock 0.6
S.E. of unexpected TFP Shock 0.0050
S.E. of news shock on TFP 0.0025
S.E. of noisy news shock on TFP 0 or 0.025
S.E. of monetary policy shock 0.0020
S.E. of idiosyncratic sentiments shock 0 or 0.0025
S.E. of measurement error on sentiments 0 or 0.0001
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Figure 5: Variance Decomposition (SVECM & GDP)
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Note: The VECM includes the growth rate of adjusted TFP, the growth rate of real per capita GDP, the rate of
inflation (CPI all) and the measure E5Y of consumer confidence. The sample period is 1960:1-2011:4. Three lags
are included in the VECM. The selected horizon for IRFs is 40. The white area corresponds to the share of variance
explained by the sentiments shock, the light grey area to the demand shock, the dark grey area to the news shock on
TFP and the dark area to the surprise shock on TFP.
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Figure 9: News Shock in the Benchmark VECM Model and in the Factor Augmented VECM
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Note: The benchmark VECM includes the growth rate of adjusted TFP, the growth rate of real per capita GDP, the
rate of inflation (CPI all) and the measure E5Y of consumer confidence. The Factor Augmented VECM includes
the growth rate of adjusted TFP, the growth rate of real per capita GDP, the rate of inflation (CPI all), the factor
and the measure E5Y of consumer confidence. The sample period is 1960:1-2011:4. Three lags are included in the
VECMs.
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Figure 10: Variance Decomposition (SVECM & Investment)
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Note: The VECM includes the growth rate of adjusted TFP, the growth rate of real per capita investment, the rate
of inflation (CPI all) and the measure E5Y of consumer confidence. The sample period is 1960:1-2011:4. Three
lags are included in the VECM. The selected horizon for IRFs is 40. The white area corresponds to the share of
variance explained by the sentiments shock, the light grey area to the demand shock, the dark grey area to the news
shock on TFP and the dark area to the surprise shock on TFP.
Figure 11: Variance Decomposition (SVECM & Consumption)
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Note: The VECM includes the growth rate of adjusted TFP, the growth rate of real per capita consumption (non-
durable & service), the rate of inflation (CPI all) and the measure E5Y of consumer confidence. The sample
period is 1960:1-2011:4. Three lags are included in the VECM. The selected horizon for IRFs is 40. The white
area corresponds to the share of variance explained by the sentiments shock, the light grey area to the demand
shock, the dark grey area to the news shock on TFP and the dark area to the surprise shock on TFP.
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Figure 12: Variance Decomposition (SVECM & Labor Productivity)
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Note: The VECM includes the growth rate of adjusted TFP, the growth rate of labor productivity, the rate of
inflation (CPI all) and the measure E5Y of consumer confidence. The sample period is 1960:1-2011:4. Three
lags are included in the VECM. The selected horizon for IRFs is 40. The white area corresponds to the share of
variance explained by the sentiments shock, the light grey area to the demand shock, the dark grey area to the news
shock on TFP and the dark area to the surprise shock on TFP.
Figure 13: Variance Decomposition (SVECM & Hours Worked)
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Note: The VECM includes the growth rate of adjusted TFP, the growth rate of real per capita GDP, the (log of)
hours worked and the measure E5Y of consumer confidence. The sample period is 1960:1-2011:4. Three lags are
included in the VECM. The selected horizon for IRFs is 40. The white area corresponds to the share of variance
explained by the sentiments shock, the light grey area to the labor market shock, the dark grey area to the news
shock on TFP and the dark area to the surprise shock on TFP.
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Figure 14: Variance Decomposition (Barsky–Sims Identification)
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Note: The VECM includes the growth rate of adjusted TFP, the growth rate of real per capita GDP, the rate of
inflation (CPI all) and the measure E5Y of consumer confidence. The sample period is 1960:1-2011:4. Three lags
are included in the VECM. The selected horizon for IRFs is 40. The white area corresponds to the share of variance
explained by the sentiments shock, the light grey area to the demand shock, the dark grey area to the news shock on
TFP and the dark area to the surprise shock on TFP.
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Figure 15: Robustness Analysis – Variance Decomposition
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SVECM with ICS
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SVECM with E12M
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SVECM with Business Confidence
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Note: The VECM includes the growth rate of adjusted TFP, the growth rate of real per capita GDP, the rate of
inflation (CPI all or CPI less) and different measures of (consumer or CEO) confidence. The sample period is
1960:1-2011:4. Three lags are included in the VECM. The selected horizon for IRFs is 40. The white area corre-
sponds to the share of variance explained by the sentiments shock, the light grey area to the demand shock, the dark
grey area to the news shock on TFP and the dark area to the surprise shock on TFP.
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